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Abstract  
Frankfurt School conceptions of culture industry and demagogy are employed in a 
synoptic historical analysis of the relation between demagogy and US culture 
industries. A recent New York Times editorial critique of Donald Trump’s 
demagogy is placed in a ‘tradition’ of tension between US high journalism and 
demagogy dating from the 1920s. This period saw the near simultaneous 
codification of professional editorial newspaper ethics and the rise of broadcast 
demagogues like Father Charles Coughlin. The tradition reaches its most famous 
conflict point in the now heroicized struggle between Edward R. Murrow and 
Joseph McCarthy. The state sought to redress the rise of culture industry 
demagogy via communications regulation known as The Fairness Doctrine. The 
latter’s demise enabled the 1990s return to prominence of demagogic speech 
within the culture industries. The article argues, however, that what was pivotal to 
this history was the facilitation of the commodification of mediated demagogic 
speech at the advent of broadcasting, a path apparently unique to the USA 
amongst the major democracies. Rather than a return to the contentious ‘burden 
on speech’ of a Fairness Doctrine, decommodification is thus the most plausible 
means of reducing US culture industry demagogy.   
 
Introduction: demagogy, propaganda, populism 
On November 24, 2015, The New York Times editorialized against 
presidential aspirant Donald Trump’s ‘racist lies’ and related 
aggressive hyperbole.1 The Times placed Trump in a tradition of US 
demagogues who arise ‘every generation or so’. Precursors of 
Trump named and comparatively cited were Joseph McCarthy and 
George Wallace. Passages of their speech were juxtaposed with 
similar statements by Trump. In a summary subheader, the editorial 
board proclaimed, ‘It’s up to the media to confront demagogy with 
the truth’.2  
Those familiar with the pantheon of heroicized US journalists would 
undoubtedly recognize here an allusion to Edward R. Murrow’s 
exposure of Joseph McCarthy on his See It Now television program 
in 1954. Murrow’s actions in that instance have been  widely 
celebrated as an exemplary ‘slaying of the dragon’ of demagogy, not 
least in the recent filmic recreation, Good Night and Good Luck, and 
as a revered exemplary figure in Aaron Sorkin’s The Newsroom.3  
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However, like Murrow, The Times editorial did more than ‘confront 
demagogy with the truth’ by using orthodox journalistic fact-
checking to expose spurious assertions as such. That much had 
already been achieved by its reporters in the days before the 
editorial. Murrow and the 2015 Times editorialists went further. 
Their exposure of demagogy required identifying and demonstrating 
certain techniques of demagogic rhetoric. Famously, Murrow did not 
confront McCarthy directly, but presented an analysis of archive 
footage to his viewers that demonstrated McCarthy’s techniques - 
such as unsubstantiable innuendo – as techniques. Murrow then 
provided McCarthy with time for a pre-recorded right of reply, 
which resulted in a set-piece demonstration by McCarthy of the very 
techniques Murrow had detailed. Likewise, it is the comparative 
identification of such rhetorical techniques that enabled The Times 
to place Trump as a successor to McCarthy and Wallace.    
In  US academic traditions, notably the fields of communication and 
rhetoric, such analysis and critique of demagogy is often articulated 
via a conception of propaganda. This ‘propaganda’, however, is not 
restricted to actions of the state nor to state actors and aspirants (like 
McCarthy and Trump); nor even to wartime or war-like 
circumstances. Historically at least, this conception of propaganda 
has been applied to advertising and other forms of commercial 
content of the culture industries.4  
So (demagogic) propaganda and culture industry do not stand in an 
oppositional binary, as in the First Amendment’s binarization of 
state and free speech. Rather, demagogic practice can be found on 
‘both sides’ of state/culture industry. Indeed, crucial to this 
liminality is the self-positioning of professional journalism within 
the culture industries, again exemplified by Murrow and The New 
York Times.5 For the 2015 Times editorialists, part of Trump’s 
success lies in his usage of social media, where ‘there’s no need to 
respond to questions about his fabrications’. Accordingly, ‘(t)hat 
makes it imperative that other forms of media challenge him’.  
Journalism, or at least professional journalism’s norm of 
accountability to verified ‘facts’, thus marks a key point of self-
differentiation from demagogy within the culture industries. Of 
course the term ‘culture industry’ dates from the 
Horkheimer/Adorno usage in reference to cinema and radio 
broadcasting.6 It is the advent of audio-visual recording, editing, and 
broadcasting that ‘culture industry’ signals technically and those 
technical innovations, certainly for Adorno, afford commodification.  
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The Times’ current concern that social media provide a public space 
devoid of journalistic accountability norms has an antecedant in the 
moment of formation of US broadcasting as a new cultural industry 
in the 1920s. At that time, not only did radio likewise pose a 
technologico-communicative alternative to print publishing, its US 
regulatory configuration came to foster broadcast demagogy. These 
‘radio demagogues’, as we shall see, are also routinely categorized 
today as populists, and their demagogy drew the particular attention 
of Adorno and his colleagues, albeit primarily under the sign of 
fascism.  
Following the recent work of Nadia Urbinati, I classify such 
populism as ‘demagogic populism’. Against the grain of many 
contemporary US historians and analysts of populism, Urbinati 
considers demagogic disfiguration a real, but not necessary, prospect 
for all populist movements. That is, demagogues have the capacity 
to ‘capture’ all or some of a populist movement’s momentum, 
especially those that aim for legitimate governmental power.7 
 
 
‘Opinion’ and the rise of demagogy within the early US culture 
industry 
Journalistic techniques of fact-verification and the related 
investigative critical exposure of nefarious political practices are 
usually traced to the canonical American Society of Newspaper 
Editors’ Code of Ethics of 1922-23.8 In that text, US professional 
journalism borrowed from positivism a confidence in ‘objectivity’ 
as a means of differentiating itself from other practices, including 
propagandists. As Schudson has put it: 
 
…journalists not only sought to affiliate with the 
prestige of science, efficiency, and Progressive 
reform but they sought to disaffiliate from the 
public relations specialists and propagandists who 
were suddenly all around them.9 
 
Journalism’s self-differentiation from ‘propagandists’ was more 
difficult in the new medium of radio, where there was no 
comparable established tradition of journalistic practice.10   
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The chaotic early years of US broadcasting were succeeded by a 
remarkable organizational arrangement. The regulation of 
broadcasting had become necessary in all nation-states, due to a 
phenomenon known later as ‘spectrum scarcity’. Since the analogue 
radio spectrum was a finite resource, frequencies needed to be 
allocated by a regulator. In the USA, that regulator was the Federal 
Radio (later Communications) Commission (FRC/FCC).11 This 
requirement in turn necessitated licensing individual stations, a 
practice that had no parallel in US newspapers. Different nation 
states attached different conditions to these licences. Common 
European practice established monopoly public service broadcasters 
(PSBs) like the BBC, funded by a flat-tax-like universal licence fee 
that enabled a ban on advertising content and revenue. These PSBs 
developed well-resourced news divisions with charters committed to 
editorial independence that resembled those of the 
professionalization movement within US newspapers. However, 
these PSB charters also routinely prohibited editorialization (in the 
sense of newspaper leader-editorials) and required that broadcast 
opinion be balanced and/or mediated by journalistic formats like 
panel discussions.12 In US terms, the PSB model enabled broadcast 
opinionated speech to achieve circulation – but not via a literal 
understanding of a ‘marketplace of ideas’. It so insulated 
opinionated speech from being rendered a commodity. 
The USA, in contrast, did pursue a literalist understanding of a 
marketplace of broadcast opinion. Unlike the broadcasting systems 
adopted in most comparable democracies, the US approach from 
1929 resolved the question of ‘public service’ requirements of 
broadcasters entirely via commercial ‘general public interest’ station 
licences. Not only would advertising be the chief revenue source for 
these licensees, but diversity of opinion would be achieved simply 
via the sale of airtime.13 Thus in the case of ‘opinion’ – rather than 
news as such – US broadcasting initially elided a central normative 
mediating role for professional journalism. The path then lay open 
for ‘raw’ opinion to be shaped as a commodity.14 
For Urbinati, a defining feature of demagogic populism, in political 
theoretical terms, is its overvaluation of the ‘opinion’ over the ‘will’ 
of a sovereign people as citizens within a democracy. ‘Will’ here 
refers to the election of governments and the configuration of 
representative institutions, often as a separation of powers. 
‘Opinion’ refers to the ‘extrainstitutional domain of political 
opinions’ that  broadly corresponds to most contemporary usage of 
‘public sphere’.15 In successful democracies, following Urbinati’s 
 
5
normative model, these two domains co-exist in balance.  
Demagogic invocations of ‘the people’ usually seek to elide or over-
ride the domain of ‘will’, claiming that the latter’s mediating 
institutions and separations of powers are inauthentic.  
We might then add to Urbinati’s model a role for professional 
journalism as an institution whose ideals speak to a comparable 
mediation within the domain of opinion. Whatever its failings, 
including a conflation of proprietor/publisher and editor/journalist, 
this was the intent of the various claims from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards that ‘the press’ constitutes a ‘fourth estate’ that 
might itself represent opinion and so be considered ‘the voice of the 
people’.16 
What was most unusual about the US culture industry configuration 
in this context was its effective institutional provision of a space, in 
the hegemonic commercial public service stations, where 
(professional) journalism’s opposite – the overvaluation of 
‘unmediated’ opinion as such –might flourish on a potentially 
national scale. Ironically, this regulatory approach formally 
designated the weaker non-commercial educational and non-profit 
stations as ‘propaganda’ stations.17 
US broadcasting had barely commenced when the most influential 
of US radio demagogues, Father Charles Coughlin, launched his 
broadcasting career in 1926.  Coughlin soon rose to prominence by 
gathering a vast audience as his weekly addresses became 
increasingly political. By the summer of 1930, he was networked by 
CBS, and by the mid-1930s his regular radio audience was 
conservatively estimated at ten million and speculated to be the 
largest in the world .18 He was initially a supporter of FDR and the 
New Deal but became increasingly critical of both. He was later 
reported to be considering an alliance with Senator Huey Long, 
himself an accomplished (radio) demagogue. Each had established a 
social movement-like organization of dedicated followers who 
gathered in large rallies: Coughlin’s Social Justice Movement and 
Long’s Share Our Wealth. Long seemed a likely challenger to FDR 
in the 1936 election, but was assassinated in 1935. Coughlin then led 
the formation of a Union Party that allied his own and Long’s 
former social movements.19 The Union Presidential candidate lost 
ignominiously in 1936, and Coughlin briefly retired from 
broadcasting. A more overtly anti-Semitic and fascistic Coughlin 
returned to the airwaves in 1938. In that year, he even republished 
the notorious and long-discredited Protocols of the Elders of Zion 
document in his newsletter, Social Justice.20 Increased self-
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regulatory actions by commercial broadcasters, among other 
reasons, ended his broadcasting career in 1940.21 Coughlin then 
continued to publish his views beyond his parish in his newsletter.  
 
Intellectual Responses to Emergent Culture Industry Demagogy 
Within critical scholarly analysis of propaganda Coughlin, 
especially his later broadcast phase, became a paradigmatic case. 
Alfred and Elizabeth Lee’s now canonical The Fine Art of 
Propaganda (1939) pursued a strategy of popular education of 
critical awareness of propaganda techniques that they termed 
‘devices’. Coughlin was found to employ seven key devices, popular 
knowledge of which, the Lees thought, would alleviate the effects of 
propaganda. Separating ‘the device from the idea’ would reveal 
‘what the idea amounts to on its own merits’.22  
The Lees even composed a rhyme, ‘Snow White and the Seven 
Devices’, to be sung in schools to the melody of the dwarves’ 
‘Heigh Ho’ song from Disney’s 1937 film, Snow White & the Seven 
Dwarves:  
Oh, we are the seven devices, 
We turn up in time of crisis;  
We play upon your feeling, 
We set your brains a-reeling, 
We are seven active contrabanders, 
We are seven clever propaganders.23  
Significantly, the Lees decided to close their Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis once the USA entered World War II, since its 
remit to assess ‘all propaganda’ dispassionately would have 
conflicted with the war effort.  
It is a surprisingly little known fact that among the admirers of the 
Lees’ work were members of the émigré Frankfurt School. Both 
Theodor Adorno and Leo Lowenthal used The Fine Art of 
Propaganda as a model for handbook-like studies of demagogues 
that they undertook within the Institute for Social Research’s Studies 
in Prejudice Project (SIPP). Adorno also referred to the Lees’ 
handbook frequently in related writings.24 Funded primarily by the 
American Jewish Committee, SIPP aimed to identify and analyse 
domestic anti-Semitic proto-fascism. Unlike the Lees’ work, SIPP 
 
7
continued its research on demagogy after the USA went to war. 
Wider social prejudice was also its object.25   
However, the SIPP demagogy studies hardly considered the US 
public a ‘Snow White’ like that in the Lees’ rhyme.  As Adorno put 
it:  ‘The devices pointed out in McLung Lee’s book on Father 
Coughlin … are only elements of a much farther-reaching pattern of 
behavior.’26 
The Lees’ emphasis, as we have seen, was on techniques of 
propaganda, which they evidently regarded as shared by nation-
states at war, public relations, and domestic demagogic figures like 
Coughlin, who were ‘playing with fascism’.27 This technicism 
usefully moved the discussion away from the still-prominent 
essentialist conception of the demagogue as an exceptional figure 
driven by a lust for power.  As Adorno reflected in 1968:  
The opinions of the demagogues are by no means 
as restricted to the lunatic fringe as one may at 
first, optimistically, suppose. They occur in 
considerable measure in the utterances of so-called 
“respectable” people, only not as succinctly and 
aggressively formulated.28  
The Frankfurt analyses, in contrast to both the essentialist 
conception and the Lees’ work, tied ‘propaganda’ and demagogy 
together more closely, but then tied both of these to the culture 
industry. The result, in Adorno’s words, was a conception of 
demagogy as ‘a kind of psycho-technics’.29 
SIPP’s demagogue was a modern figure, not even necessarily a 
skillful orator of the assembly.  He – consideration of the prospect of 
female demagogues is a significant lacuna – did not persuade by 
applying the classical techniques of oratory to an issue of the day, 
nor by developing an orthodox political programme. Rather, he 
consistently worked with ‘an amazing stereotypy’ of agitational 
themes. The demagogue was thus a narcissistic opportunist who was 
best understood psychoanalytically while the stereotypy of the 
techniques, as initially identified by the Lees and extended by SIPP, 
lent themselves to culture industry standardization.  
As Adorno notes in the quotation above, the demagogue differs from 
his audience primarily by degree – in his capacity to articulate 
succinctly using verbal aggression. Indeed, it is the performance of a 
mode of disinhibited hysteria that elicits a rapport with the 
audience.30 This dynamic was assessed within SIPP as irrational in 
that it did not operate cognitively, but – in contrast to essentialist 
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models of the demagogue – neither did it rest on a binarization of a 
correspondingly essentialist conception of ‘emotionalism’ to account 
for demagogic success.  
The key psychoanalytic dynamic of that rapport for Adorno, 
Horkheimer, and Lowenthal was based in paranoia and projection. 
The psychotechnics of demagogy relied on thematics that portrayed 
social relations as entirely interpersonal ones. In other words, and 
consistent with Urbinati’s more recent conception, demagogic 
speech so seeks to elide all forms of institutional mediation. Beyond 
this, and once institutional and systemic social relations are elided, 
the paranoia/projection dynamic can fixate on the alleged 
conspirators.  
The complexity of this model may seem at odds with some of the 
titular forms SIPP employed: Prophets of Deceit, ‘Enlightenment as 
Mass Deception’ and so on. So, again, a risk arises of an over-
reliance on an unexamined notion of rationality pitted against the 
irrationality of demagogic mobilization. There is no question that the 
use of an irrationalism that exploits mood states forms the core SIPP 
charge against the demagogues. However, their audiences are 
typically regarded sympathetically as victims – albeit potentially 
dangerous victims if fully mobilized – rather than merely dismissed 
with elitist disdain.  
Moreover, the titular deceit motif is also indicative, for Adorno at 
least, of a sympathetic dialogue with American democratic norms. 
In later writings, Adorno certainly stated this explicitly.31  It would 
seem that, to some degree, the SIPP researchers were prepared to 
speak to, but not embrace, what I would call a ‘liberal exposure’ 
framework. Consistent with the Lees’ work, and indeed The Times 
editorial regarding Trump, this framework posits a good cognitive 
citizen who is susceptible to rational argument and always-already 
capable of rational judgement. Present this citizen with sufficient 
information, so this critical logic goes, and demagogic power, 
understood as deceit, collapses.  
For Adorno, there is a prominent counter-example to this liberal 
exposure strategy (or ‘truth propaganda’, as he calls it): the case of 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion document. Its continuing 
survival and circulation – including, as we have seen, by Coughlin – 
despite its exposure as a fake (by The Times of London) is sufficient 
evidence for Adorno that ‘truth propaganda’ is an inadequate 
counter-demagogic strategy.32 
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Pathological Tradition or Populist Dissidence? 
Now, notwithstanding The Times’s identification of Trump’s 
demagogy as the reiteration of a generational pattern, to suggest here 
that Coughlin’s demagogy forms part of a long demagogic populist 
tradition within the culture industries remains controversial.  
For decades, American historians have debated a similar thesis, most 
associated with the work of Richard Hofstadter. Drawing openly on 
the SIPP research, Hofstadter and his collaborators argued in the 
1950s and 1960s that Coughlin had rearticulated – and so changed 
the emphasis of – key thematics from the US Populist movement. A 
line, albeit a crooked one, could thus be drawn from the Populists to 
McCarthy.33 Hofstadter famously named this tendency ‘the paranoid 
style’ in US politics.34  
Hostadter’s historian critics misinterpreted the chief ‘target’ of his 
suspicions (Coughlin) and mounted a defence of the Populist 
movement as such.35 This defence of the legitimacy of Populism – 
and its Progressivist legacy – was extended to Coughlin and Long 
who, in Alan Brinkley’s much-lauded work, were rechristened 
‘dissidents’.36 Demagogy disappeared from the revisionist 
vocabulary, and in what remains the definitive work on US 
populism, Kazin’s The Populist Persuasion, even Coughlin’s anti-
Semitic demagogy is relocated as merely ‘a populism of fools’.37  
This revisionist orthodoxy provides the background to Urbinati’s 
1998 observation that while European populism is routinely marked 
‘bad’, mainly due to its associations with fascism, US populism 
seems to endure as almost necessarily ‘good’.38  
Yet parallels between the two are certainly discernible. If recent 
European developments are dominated by the rise of new formations 
that seek to render proto-fascist positions ‘respectable’ within multi-
party electoral systems, the US narrative is well-known to be one of 
a steady shift towards the Right by the Republican Party, driven in 
part by demagogic figures. Trump can be readily located within such 
developments. 
More recent revisionist research, still positioned against Hofstadter, 
has emphasised the grassroots character of this Republican 
transformation from the early 1960s through to the emergence of a 
Reaganite ‘populist conservativism’.39 
In an important recent corrective to the terms of this enduring 
debate, Heather Hendershot has highlighted the role of minor but 
influential post-McCarthy cold war demagogues who proliferated 
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until the beginnings of the Reaganite ascendancy in the 1970s.40 As 
in Europe, their positions were regarded as too extreme for the 
respectable New Right. Yet they nonetheless contributed to the 
rightward shift. 
Hendershot’s key insight is the underestimation of the significance 
of the role of broadcasting in all these developments.41 But this 
claim does not refer to the routine acknowledgement of the rise and 
very gradual decline of mainstream network television’s influence 
on political communication in electoral politics since the televising 
of election debates. Rather, she refers primarily to the curiously 
pivotal, but initially marginal, role of broadcast radio in the 
rightward shift. Hendershot’s ‘ultras’ – ultraconservative or 
extremist demagogues – resumed elements of Coughlin’s practices 
on a smaller scale. While others of their ilk did not use radio, those 
researched by Hendershot used it in highly strategic ways and as a 
result were more successful and enduring.42   
Moreover, radio provided not just a forum but a consolidating form 
to what appeared from a radio-blind perspective to be a disparate 
array of eccentric egoists. Small independently owned stations 
scheduled these figures in succession. Even Hendershot doesn’t 
draw out the full implications of her insight here. For her ultras thus 
established a bridge between Coughlin’s solo purchases of discrete 
packets of radio broadcast time – funded by listener donations – and 
the contemporary format of ‘aggressive talk radio’.  
My titular ‘long tradition’ thus relies on the slow development of 
what Adorno and Horkheimer saw as a two-sided merger of 
propaganda and cultural industrial form. Arguing from the case of 
advertising in the 1940s, they pointed to the US broadcast culture 
industry’s dependence on advertising for revenue but equally to 
advertising’s role as propagandistic cultural form (in the broad 
critical sense of this term introduced above).43 In the case of this 
tradition of demagogic speech, a comparable convergence point was 
not reached until the 1990s when an important shift occurred in 
mediated demagogy’s other liberal nemesis, regulation.  
 
Culture-Industrial Demagogy Unbound?  
The surfacing of Trump’s demagogy vindicates a predictive warning 
issued within the last writings of the First Amendment and media-
regulation scholar, C. Edwin Baker. Baker developed an entire 
‘democratic safeguard’ model of democracy to address what he 
called ‘the Berlusconi effect’ and its risk of ‘demagogic power’. 
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Unlike most theorists of populism, he saw definite risks for US 
democracy – indeed all democracies – in the precedent set by that  
European case.44 Certainly Trump shares with Berlusconi not only a 
disinhibited mode of demagogic rhetoric but also the willingness to 
convert vast reserves of economic capital into a personal grasp for 
the highest political office.45  
Yet such a model of demagogic media power is a somewhat limited 
one, even if it does account for real threats. It relies on what is in 
many ways a nineteenth-century model of the ‘politicallly minded 
press owner’, i.e. a proprietor-publisher baron who subordinates 
journalistic professionalism and editorial autonomy to the use of 
publications for personally preferred political goals.46 Undoubtedly 
that figure has survived and meets the demagogic tradition in 
Murdoch’s US Fox News.  
The SIPP studies laid the ground for the recognition that demagogy 
could also become a cultural industrial commodity administered by a 
shareholder corporation, rather than the family businesses typical of 
nineteenth-century press barons and their successors. The format of 
aggressive talk radio is, in this context, economically self-sustaining 
in that its production costs are low. As a result, it has tended to 
replace local news services. The rationale for its expansion thus 
need not require a baron-like directive but merely the banality of 
cost-effectiveness. 
Moreover, the key figures in this culture-industrial demagogic 
tradition – from Coughlin to Limbaugh – have tended not to pursue 
political power for themselves but instead sought to move close to 
those in power while claiming to act as a representative of popular 
opinion. To this extent they constitute a more direct populist 
challenge to the fourth estate conception of opinion representation 
than to political office-holders as such. They also threaten the 
professionalist ‘social responsibility’ ethic within US network 
broadcast  journalism that, as Baker reminds us, was one means of 
redressing the informational consequences of concentrated broadcast 
media markets, especially in television.47  
Historically, such self-regulatory professionalization of broadcast 
journalism was coupled with stuttering attempts to redress the rise of 
broadcast demagogy more directly, including the use of overt 
content regulation. Coughlin presented an ongoing problem to 
nascent US broadcasting corporations (notably CBS & NBC) and to 
the FRC/FCC, whereby his notoriety continually presented 
managements with spotfires of controversy.  
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The NBC network, dominant at first, moved early to delimit locally 
based figures like Coughlin by refusing to sell airtime ‘for 
discussion of controversial issues religious or otherwise’ and by 
insisting, from 1928 onwards, on only dealing with central or 
national agencies of major religions.48 The CBS network could not 
afford to practise NBC’s regulatory position on sale of airtime and 
attracted many religious broadcasters, including Coughlin. ‘(A)s a 
result of its battles over Coughlin’, and following an attempt to 
‘delete objectionable material’ from one of Coughlin’s speeches in 
1931, CBS moved to the NBC policy regarding the sale of airtime 
and cancelled Coughlin’s contract.49 He then ‘cobbled together his 
own network’ from independent stations.50 Finally, in 1939, the 
National Association of Broadcasters, which represented 
independent stations as well as network affiliates, adopted a self-
regulatory code requiring panel discussion of all controversial 
matters. It was less an enforceable directive than ‘a means of giving 
squeamish stations a reason to deny’ contracts.51 Coughlin’s radio 
career finished when his existing contracts expired in 1940.   
 
The FRC/FCC moved towards European regulatory practice by 
banning all editorialization in 1940 and then shifting to its famous 
Fairness Doctrine, which – like the panel model adopted by the self-
regulators – sought to achieve balance across a schedule by 
guaranteeing a right of reply to contentious opinion. Broadly, these 
were the same norms of ‘balance’ that professionalizing newspaper 
editors advocated but were here applied to licensee-proprietors. 
Perhaps most notably, the right-of-reply principle was not only 
invoked by Murrow in his conflict with McCarthy but was also one 
he knew from his previous development work in broadcast editorial 
policies as a CBS news executive.52  
 
The Fairness Doctrine remained the dominant US regulatory 
framework from 1949 to 1987. McCarthy exploited it and similar 
FCC rules to gain television airtime.53 It was used, at times very 
cynically, by the Kennedy administration to silence the ultras in the 
1960s.54 The Reagan administration effectively ended the Fairness 
Doctrine in 1987 and, it is widely agreed, so opened the doors to the 
rise of aggressive talk radio in the 1990s, leading to the 250% 
expansion of this format in the USA between 1990 and 2006.55  
Scholars now refer to the ‘echo chamber’ of a conservative media 
establishment, with talk radio at its core, that arose during the 1990s 
as ‘mainstream’ broadcasting of the Fairness Doctrine era and its 
news programs lost hegemony. This formation continues to define 
itself against the ‘media elite’ of those who still practise the liberal 
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norms of professional neutrality.56 The commodification of 
demagogic speech is thus complete.  
 
My long tradition has thus been an episodic one. While regulation 
interrupted its development, the crucial moment, in my view, was 
the early facilitation of demagogic speech, not as the broadcast of 
speech as such but as an emergent program form in a system that 
hegemonized the commodification of airtime. Baker disagreed with 
the Fairness Doctrine on standard First Amendment principles, but 
did more than most such scholars to recognize the contributing role 
of a political economy of speech markets to such First Amendment 
deliberations. He also recognized that the replacement of spectrum 
scarcity with digital abundance reconfigured, but did not solve, this 
dilemma.57 Indeed, contemporary demagogic ‘ultras’ tend to be 
multi-platform practitioners.58 
 
The New York Times is of course correct in seeking to revive the 
liberal exposure strategy as each demagogue arises within electoral 
politics, and its concern that such anti-demagogic journalistic norms 
are absent or weak in the horizontal post-broadcast forms of digital 
media are pertinent. But cultural-industrial demagogy, as Adorno 
warned, is not always so susceptible to ‘truth propaganda’. 
Horkheimer and Adorno saw an opportunity instead in the differing 
industrial and regulatory configurations of the broadcasting and 
cinema sectors of the culture industry. They planned to use the less 
consolidated field of cinema for their own (unfulfilled) counter-
demagogic action.59   
 
Similarly nimble perspectives regarding the contemporary cultural 
industries may become necessary to complement the approach of 
such newspapers as The New York Times. The most pertinent 
general lesson this tradition offers to those who seek to counter 
demagogic speech in the culture industries is the need to find 
appropriate means to delimit it, not by censorship, but by its 
decommodification.  
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